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MARTHA E. MULVANY
State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las
Vegas: The Misuse of History and
Precedent in the Abolition of the
Pueblo Water Rights Doctrine in New
Mexico
ABSTRACT
The pueblo water rights doctrine permits a municipality that was
originally founded as either a Spanish or Mexican colonization
pueblo to appropriate unlimited water from adjacent watercourses
in order to meet the needs of a growing population. Of uncertain
historical validity, the doctrine was first recognized by the New
Mexico Supreme Court in 1958 and then repudiated in the 2004
case of State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas. That
opinion, while purporting to base its rejection of the doctrine on
prior New Mexico water law, is founded on conflicting views of
history and an inconsistent application of the doctrine of stare
decisis. In a state like New Mexico, where water is scarce and
rights to water are valuable, the abrogation of such an important
property right called for a clear and consistent rationale. Instead,
State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas shies away from the
court's responsibility to evaluate historical fact, makes
unprincipled use of prior case law, and rests upon the authority of
the genre of the judicial opinion and the power of the state rather
than on sound reasoning.
I. INTRODUCTION
In State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, the Supreme Court of
New Mexico struck the pueblo water rights doctrine' from New Mexico
* Martha Ellen Mulvany graduated summa cum laude from the New Mexico School
of Law in 2005. She is now an associate at the firm of Freedman, Boyd, Daniels, Hollander
& Goldberg, P.A., in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
1. "Pueblo" is the Spanish word for town. The pueblo water right refers to rights
claimed by municipalities that are successors to Spanish or Mexican colonization grants.
These rights are to be distinguished from the water rights of Pueblo Indians, although they
share some similarities. Compare Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 66 N.M. 64, 79-86,
343 P.2d 654, 664-69 (1958) (describing the pueblo water rights doctrine), with State ex rel.
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law.2 Originally, recognition of the right stemmed from a belief that the
doctrine existed under Mexican law in 1848, when the United States
signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and promised to respect the
vested property rights of people who lived in the territories taken from
Mexico.3 Under the doctrine, a city that succeeded a Spanish or Mexican
colonization pueblo could take as much water from an adjacent
watercourse as required for municipal purposes.4 The right expanded,
permitting a city to appropriate increasing amounts of water as its
population grew.5 This expansive quality, coupled with the fact that the
pueblo right was paramount to the rights of all other users, was the
primary reason that the doctrine was so controversial, since it meant that
other users could lose rights vested under the doctrine of prior
appropriation if a city were to grow and need more water.6 After the
pueblo water rights doctrine was first adopted in the 1958 decision of
Cartwright v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico,7 it came under regular
attack by scholars who argued that historical evidence proved that the
pueblo water right had no precedent in the law of either Spain or
Mexico. 8 In 2004, when the New Mexico Supreme Court was presented
again with the question of the doctrine's validity in State ex rel. Martinez,
it overruled Cartwright, thereby abolishing the pueblo water right in
New Mexico.9
Despite its complete rejection of a previously recognized
property right, State ex rel. Martinez is not likely to cause much of an
Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993 passim (D.N.M. 1985) (discussing the water rights of
Pueblo Indians).
2. See State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 135 N.M. 375, 376, 89 P.3d 47, 48
(2004).
3. See Cartwright, 66 N.M. at 71, 343 P.2d at 659.
4. State ex rel. Martinez, 135 N.M. at 376, 89 P.3d at 48.
5. Id. at 378, 89 P.3d at 50.
6. See id. at 378-79, 387, 89 P.3d at 50-51, 59.
7. 66 N.M. 64,343 P.2d 654.
8. See DANIEL TYLER, THE MYTHICAL PUEBLO RIGHTS DOCTRINE: WATER
ADMINISTRATION IN HISPANIC NEW MEXICO 45 (1990); MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE
HISPANIC SOUTHWEST: A SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 1550-1850, at 35, 159 (1984); NORRIS
HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER 1770S-1990s, at 45 (1992);
Jefferson E. LeCates, Water Law - The Effect of Acts of the Sovereign on the Pueblo Rights
Doctrine in New Mexico, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 727, 731 (1968); Anastasia Stevens, Pueblo Water
Rights in New Mexico, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 535, 535 (1988); Eric B. Kunkel, The Spanish Law
of Waters in the United States: From Alfonso the Wise to the Present Day, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV.
341, 371-74 (2001); Peter L. Reich, Mission Revival Jurisprudence: State Courts and Hispanic
Water Law Since 1850, at 69 WASH. L. REV. 869 passim (1994); Pierre Levy, Which Right Is
Right: The Pueblo Water Rights Doctrine Meets Prior Appropriation, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 413,
426-27, 433-34 (1995).
9. See State ex rel. Martinez, 135 N.M. at 386-90, 89 P.3d at 58-62.
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outcry in New Mexico or elsewhere. Las Vegas was the only New
Mexico city to ever succeed in claiming the right, so its abolition does not
have far-reaching consequences for the rest of the state. Furthermore,
water allocation in New Mexico is determined by a system of prior
appropriation and beneficial use that is not affected by the elimination of
the doctrine, and, as a result, State ex rel. Martinez should not have great
impact on the body of New Mexico water law as a whole. Neither is the
opinion in any way groundbreaking in its analysis of the historical
validity of the pueblo water right, since it builds on arguments
previously made in the courts of New Mexico, Texas, and California.
What is interesting about the opinion is not what it has to say about
water law at all. Instead, the discussion of the pueblo water rights
doctrine in State ex rel. Martinez is primarily notable for its unprincipled
use of history and the inconsistent application of the doctrine of stare
decisis. Because the court's explication of the legal and historical sources
of its decision is so irrational and, therefore, so intriguing to attempt to
follow, this article looks at the internal workings of the court's opinion
rather than to the consequences it will have in the external world.
There are several obvious lines of analysis that this article might
follow, but which it does not: This is not a historical piece. It does not
address the question of whether the pueblo water right actually existed
under Mexican law in 1848 except insofar as is necessary to set out the
historical evidence that was presented to the State ex rel. Martinez court.
In doing so, the article does not try to interpret the primary sources that
the court makes use of; nor does it evaluate the correctness of the books,
law review articles, and other secondary source materials discussing the
right. Instead, the article takes the sources that were before the court at
face value and examines the ways State ex rel. Martinez made use of them.
This article also does not attempt to assess whether the case was rightly
or wrongly decided on either legal or policy grounds. Rather than
evaluating State ex rel. Martinez with reference to history, law, or policy,
this critique evaluates the text with reference to the expectations that the
text itself establishes. In order to do so, it employs a formalist approach,
in the sense of literary rather than legal formalism.10
10. It is probably more accurate to say that this reading borrows some formalist tools,
since it is not premised on purely formalist theories about how the meaning of a text is
created. This reading does not assume that the text itself is the sole source of its meaning,
or that the meaning of the case is not created by its author or by its readers. Instead, it is
based upon a catholic perspective that presumes that meaning is produced by all three. In
this way, the approach is not strictly formalist, and this particular reading is intended to be
just one among many possible ways to look at the case.
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In textual analysis, formalism refers to "a method of criticizing
literary works that focuses on language and genre to the exclusion of
other explanations for the work's meaning (such as historical context or
author's intent)."" In the United States, formalist literary criticism came
to prominence in the 1930s in the works of the New Critics.12 The New
Critical method of literary analysis interpreted texts separate from any
notion of authorial intent or social context, thereby "defending the
autonomy of literature and demanding that it be judged by purely
aesthetic rather than moral or political standards." 13 This attempt to
isolate literary works from their social, psychological, economic, and
political contexts has been criticized for romanticizing and depoliticizing
texts,' 4 and among literary scholars, New Criticism has generally been
replaced with Marxist, psychoanalytic, reader-response, feminist, and
deconstructionist theories, among others.
But apart from its underlying assumptions about how texts are
or are not socially situated, some of the formalist tools employed by the
New Critics remain useful. The basic method of New Criticism is the
technique of close reading, whereby the reader tries to account "for
every detail of a single text as a part of an integrated whole."' 5 Relying
on an understanding of the literary conventions of a text's genre, the
New Critics believed that a reader could evaluate the quality of a text by
determining the degree to which its tensions and ambiguities were
resolved into a harmonious unity.16 Although the New Critics primarily
analyzed poetry, these methods of close reading and evaluation of a text
based on generic expectations and internal coherence can be applied to
other kinds of works as well.
The formalist approach used here involves a close reading that
examines what qualities are understood to be necessary in a "good"
appellate opinion and looks at the degree to which State ex rel. Martinez
succeeds in meeting the requirements of the genre. In that sense, this
discussion of the case is elitist to the degree that, like the interpretations
of the New Critics, it assumes some texts are inherently better than
11. Jeffrey Malkan, Literary Formalism, Legal Formalism, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1393
(1998).
12. See GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITIcISMS OF LAW 114-15
(2000).
13. Id. at 115.
14. See, e.g., TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 47 (1983) (stating
that New Criticism "was the ideology of an uprooted, defensive intelligentsia who
reinvented in literature what they could not locate in reality. Poetry was the new religion, a
nostalgic haven from the alienations of industrial capitalism.").
15. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 12, at 116.
16. See id.
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others, and that, by reading carefully, one can determine which texts are
good and which are not.17 The New Critics felt that judging a text "is like
judging a pudding or a machine," and that when evaluating the
pudding, text, or machine, one simply "demands that it work." 18
Following in this formalist tradition, this reading attempts to show that,
on its own terms and within the conventions of its genre, State ex rel.
Martinez simply does not work.
II. STATE EX REL. MARTINEZ V. CITY OF LAS VEGAS AND THE
REPUDIATION OF THE PUEBLO WATER RIGHT
A. Cartwright Establishes the Pueblo Water Rights Doctrine in New
Mexico
In 1958, New Mexico adopted the pueblo water rights doctrine
in the case of Cartwright v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico.19 There,
plaintiffs who claimed rights to water in the Gallinas River sued the
Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM), arguing that the
company was misappropriating the river's waters. PNM had been
diverting water from the Gallinas for distribution to both the Town of
Las Vegas, New Mexico, and the City of Las Vegas, New Mexico. The
Town of Las Vegas intervened in the suit, asserting its pueblo water right
as an affirmative defense on behalf of the company. The Town claimed
the right as a successor to the Mexican colonization pueblo, Nuestra
Senora de Las Dolores de Las Vegas. When the case reached the Supreme
Court of New Mexico, the court, relying heavily on a series of California
cases establishing the right, recognized the pueblo water rights doctrine
as the law of New Mexico's antecedent sovereigns, which would be
respected as a vested property right under the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo.20
17. This assumption that some judicial opinions are better than others has ethical as
well as aesthetic implications. As one legal scholar puts it, the question of whether it is
possible to distinguish a good legal argument from a bad one "is important because if we
cannot distinguish between good and bad legal reasons, then we are ultimately in a world
of total subjectivity. Power is the only thing that will matter. Our reasons will be nothing
more than decorations." Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 733, 737 (2004).
18. W.K. Wimsatt, Jr. & Monroe C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, in THE VERBAL
ICON: STUDIES IN THE MEANING OF POETRY 1, 4 (1954).
19. See 66 N.M. 64,343 P.2d 645 (1958).
20. See id. at 71, 84-86, 343 P.2d at 659, 668-69.
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B. Factual and Procedural Background
The State ex rel. Martinez litigation began in 1978, when the New
Mexico State Engineer filed a complaint demanding that the City of Las
Vegas describe what right, if any, it had to use the water in the Pecos
River system, including the Gallinas River. The City moved for partial
summary judgment, claiming that, as determined by Cartwright, it had a
pueblo right to use as much water from the Gallinas as necessary for
municipal purposes.21 The district court denied the motion for summary
judgment, and, after two appeals, the court of appeals held that the
pueblo water rights doctrine was not valid under New Mexico law.22 The
Supreme Court of New Mexico granted certiorari and, in 2004, agreeing
with the court of appeals, overruled Cartwright and abolished the pueblo
water rights doctrine.23
C. The Court's Proffered Rationale
In State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, the New Mexico
Supreme Court examined the history of the pueblo water rights doctrine
at great length but declined to take a position on its historical validity.24
Instead, the court overruled Cartwright because of its conclusion that the
decision was "based on a flawed analysis of New Mexico water law.
" 25
1. Intentional Indecision about History and the Pueblo Water Right
Cartwright's extended historical analysis of the pueblo water
rights doctrine was based on the rule that a court may take judicial notice
of the laws of antecedent sovereigns.26 Because Cartwright determined
that a pueblo water right existed under Spanish and Mexican law before
the New Mexico territory was acquired by the United States, State ex rel.
Martinez declined to treat the issue of its historical validity as if it were
21. See City of Las Vegas v. Oman, 110 N.M. 425, 427, 796 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Ct. App.
1990).
22. See State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 118 N.M. 257, 263, 880 P.2d 868, 874
(1994) (N.M. Ct. App.). Clearly the fact that the court of appeals refused to follow the
supreme court decision in Cartwright was an act of overreaching that was addressed when
the case reached the New Mexico Supreme Court. However, that portion of the State ex rel.
Martinez decision is beyond the scope of this article.
23. See State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 135 N.M. 375, 376-77, 89 P.3d 47, 48-
49 (2004).
24. See id. at 383, 89 P.3d at 55.
25. Id.
26. See Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 66 N.M. 64,84,343 P.2d 654,668 (1958).
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an issue of first impression.27 The court emphasized the importance of
stare decisis and said that "the question is not whether we agree with the
State Engineer's historical view of the law of antecedent sovereigns but,
instead, whether this court's historical analysis in Cartwright is so clearly
erroneous as to create a compelling reason" to overrule it.28 Although
State ex rel. Martinez claims to use the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review, the law of antecedent sovereigns is a question of law to be
reviewed de novo,29 and the court seems to make the latter sort of
independent review of whether the pueblo water right was a part of
Spanish and Mexican jurisprudence.
The State Engineer argued that the pueblo water rights doctrine
as adopted in Cartwright was not historically accurate because it did not
comport with the Spanish and Mexican practice of equitable
apportionment and common use as described in historical documents
like the Plan of Pitic and the Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reynos de las
Indias.3° State ex rel. Martinez rejected this argument, since such a view of
history "conflicts with this Court's longstanding interpretation of water
law.. .under Spanish and Mexican rule."31 In previous cases, the supreme
court had declared that "the law of prior appropriation existed under the
Mexican republic at the time of the acquisition of New Mexico." 32
Because the current water law of New Mexico is "based on this Court's
interpretation of the law of antecedent sovereigns," State ex rel. Martinez
could not reject the pueblo water rights doctrine by accepting an
alternate historical version of Spanish and Mexican law.33 To do so
would "undermin[e] the historical basis for New Mexico's adoption of
the doctrine of prior appropriation as a legacy of antecedent
sovereigns." 34 As a result, the supreme court held that "New Mexico
does not recognize equitable distribution as the system of water law that
survived the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo." 35
27. See State ex rel. Martinez, 135 N.M. at 382, 89 P.3d at 56.
28. Id.
29. See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 113 (1994).
30. The Plan of Pitic was developed by the King of Spain and set out as the model for
all colonization pueblos. State ex rel. Martinez, 135 N.M. at 378, 89 P.3d at 50. The
Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias was a compilation of the laws governing New
Spain that continued to be followed by Mexico at the time of the Las Vegas land grant in
1835. Id. at 378-79, 89 P.3d at 50-51.
31. Id. at 384, 89 P.3d at 56.
32. Id. at 385, 89 P.3d at 57 (quoting United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.,
9 N.M. 292, 306, 51 P. 674,678 (1898), rev'd on other grounds, 174 U.S. 690 (1899)).
33. Id. at 384, 89 P.3d at 56.
34. Id. at 385, 89 P.3d at 57.
35. Id.
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Taking a different tack, the court then observed that any reliance
on historical evidence creates problems for the law, since "historical
opinion can fluctuate based on newly found historical evidence or novel
interpretations of extant sources." 36 The court asserted that "[u]nlike
history as a matter of theory,...the law, as reflected by the doctrine of
stare decisis, requires a greater degree of certainty and predictability."
37
The court feared that if it were to adopt a historical analysis denying the
validity of the pueblo water right, "the discovery of new evidence
supporting the existence of the pueblo rights doctrine in Spanish and
Mexican law would remain a possibility.. .which would undoubtedly
lead to another dispute" over the legitimacy of the right.38 Wishing to
avoid these complications, the court found that when it comes to
"property rights in general and water rights in particular,... defining
these rights based on prevailing scholarship would create an intolerable
degree of uncertainty." 39 For this reason, the court refused to premise its
rejection of Cartwright upon historical evidence that the pueblo water
right did not exist under either Spanish or Mexican law.4°
2. The Right's Incompatibility with New Mexico Water Law
The court instead based its decision on the proposition that "the
pueblo rights doctrine is inconsistent with New Mexico law and not
protected by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo." 41 This is because the
perpetually expanding nature of the right would conflict with the
foundation of New Mexico water law -the principle of beneficial use.
42
Because of this inconsistency, the court said that the historical legitimacy
of the doctrine was "irrelevant" to its determination of the case.43 It held
that, "[riegardless of whether the pueblo rights doctrine has a valid
historical basis in the law of antecedent sovereigns, New Mexico water
law, following the Treaty, precludes its recognition." 44
The New Mexico Constitution requires that "[bleneficial use
shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of
water."45 In New Mexico, as in other Western states, "it is only by the
application of the water to a beneficial use that the perfected right to the
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 386, 89 P.3d at 58.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 3.
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use is acquired," and consequently, "an appropriator can only acquire a
perfected right to so much water as he applies to a beneficial use." 46
After an initial appropriation, water must be put to use within a
"reasonable time."47 For municipalities, a reasonable time has been
statutorily defined as 40 years. 48 State ex rel. Martinez held that the pueblo
rights doctrine was inconsistent with this system of beneficial use since a
pueblo's successor would not be required to put water to use within a
reasonable period of time after its appropriation. 49 Because the pueblo
water right permits an unlimited expansion to meet the needs of an
increased population, other appropriators might have their rights
diminished and even extinguished as a city's population increased50 The
court found that upholding the right would "intolerably interfere[] with
the goals of definiteness and certainty contemplated by prior
appropriation," and that such uncertainty could "paralyze others from
legitimately making beneficial use of unappropriated waters on the same
stream as a pueblo out of fear" that their rights would be extinguished as
the pueblo grew.51
As additional evidence of the doctrine's incompatibility with
New Mexico water law, the court observed that, unlike water rights
under the system of prior appropriation, the pueblo water right is not
forfeited when it is not used.5 2 Believing that forfeiture is an "essential
punitive tool" by which water is "made to do the greatest good [for] the
greatest number,"53 State ex rel. Martinez held that the pueblo water right
would promote the "underutilization of essential public waters" and
prevent the "efficient, economic use of water that is necessary for
survival in this arid region." 4
To further support the position that New Mexico should not
recognize the doctrine, the court asserted that the expanding nature of
the pueblo water right was not protected by the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo.55 United States courts have concluded that the treaty does not
46. State ex rel. Martinez, 135 N.M. at 386, 89 P.3d at 58 (citing State ex rel. Cmty. Ditches
v. Tularosa Cmty. Ditch, 19 N.M. 352,371, 143 P. 207, 213 (1914)).
47. Id. at 387, 89 P.3d at 59.
48. See NMSA 1978 § 72-1-9 (Repl. 1997).
49. See State ex rel. Martinez, 135 N.M. at 387, 89 P.3d at 59.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 388,89 P.3d at 60.
53. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Id.
55. See id. But cf. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1010 (D.N.M. 1985)
(finding that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo protected the expanding nature of an Indian
Pueblo water right, such that the Pueblo had a "prior right to use all of the water of the
stream system necessary for their domestic uses and that necessary to irrigate their lands,"
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protect inchoate rights.56 Because the court found that the expanding
nature of the right, which allowed increased water use in response to
increased needs, would have been "a matter of grace" and subject to the
sovereign's power to reallocate water according to changing
circumstances, it determined that this expansive property right was
inchoate and therefore not guaranteed by the treaty.57 The court then
stated that while it is "true that New Mexico has protected water rights
in existence at the time of the Treaty and before the enactment of a
comprehensive water code in 1907 .... this protection has always been
circumscribed by the principle of beneficial use and limited to vested
rights." 8 Although article XVI, section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution
states that "[n]othing contained in this article shall be construed to
impair existing vested rights," the court found that the expanding nature
of the pueblo rights doctrine was not an existing right within the
meaning of the constitution because of its incompatibility with the
principle of beneficial use.59
The court concluded that a city founded under Mexican or
Spanish colonization grants had water rights that are "recognized in
New Mexico in the same manner as other municipal water rights." 6° The
date of the colonization grant establishes the date of priority, but the
priority date only applies to the amount of water that the municipality
puts to use within a reasonable time of the initial appropriation.61
Accordingly, the City of Las Vegas had a vested right only to the amount
of water it put to use within a reasonable time of its initial grant.
62
Because the pueblo water rights doctrine was found to conflict
with New Mexico water law, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
the pueblo water right was a "doctrinal anachronism" that represented a
"positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the law."63 Under
such circumstances, the court found that it had the "compelling reason"
needed to overrule Cartwright.64
and that this priority applied to the acreage in use up to the time of the treaty. Subsequent
to that, the priority was protected by federal law.).
56. See State ex rel. Martinez, 135 N.M. at 388, 89 P.3d at 60 (citing Cartwright v. Pub.
Serv. Co. of N.M., 66 N.M. 64, 113-17, 343 P.2d 654, 687-91 (1958) (Federici, D.J.,
dissenting); United States v. City of Santa Fe, 165 U.S. 675, 713-16 (1897)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 389, 89 P.3d at 61.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 390, 89 P.3d at 62 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 855 (1992); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)).
64. Id.
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III. FORMALIST ANALYSIS OF HOW THE OPINION OPERATES,
AND WHY IT DOES NOT WORK
A. Judicial Authority and the Generic Conventions of the Appellate
Opinion
The appellate opinion has three main functions: first, to
intervene in the external world by forcing people to act in the manner
prescribed by the text; second, to present a persuasive set of facts and a
coherent line of reasoning to support a court's decision to intervene in
the way that it has; and third, to reinforce the court's authority to
intervene at all. A court can generally succeed in forcing the parties to act
as directed, regardless of how well- or ill-constructed its opinion is, but
the second two functions, because they depend on the effective use of
language rather than on the power of the state, are harder to achieve.
Success in presenting a persuasive rationale for the court's actions
depends on the formulation of an internally coherent, intellectually
sound argument for the court's position. The court's assertion of its own
authority, in turn, rests on both the persuasiveness of its rationale as well
as on certain literary conventions peculiar to the genre of the appellate
opinion. State ex rel. Martinez attempts to legitimize itself by using many
of the formulae that make up the appellate genre, but because the
opinion fails to articulate a logical and coherent argument for its
position, and because it rejects the conventional use of history and stare
decisis, it fails to create the impression of internal authority necessary in
a good judicial decision.
The reason that a court's opinion must create a sense of its own
authority, rather than relying solely on the authority conferred upon it
by our system of government, is that establishing this kind of internal
legitimacy is necessary to "reinforce [the judiciary's] oft-challenged and
arguably shaky authority to tell others -including our duly elected
political leaders-what to do."65 Because the judiciary is largely
unelected, it "must always respond to the fundamental inconsistency of
imposing a separate authority on the democratic process." 66 In addition
to staking out its territory within our democratic system, the opinion
must establish its validity as part of the common law, in that it arises
from past authorities and therefore may serve as an appropriate
65. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1995).
66. Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
201, 207 (1990).
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precedent for future decisions. In these ways, appellate decisions are
always "efforts at self-justification." 67
In order to achieve these goals of self-justification and the
legitimization of authority, opinions rely on generic formulae. To some
degree, these formulae are simply the result of practical considerations
for the writer, in that "[flrequency of production, professional
inclination, and political routinization" all require the use of
conventional arguments and structures so as to "match experience and
form in ways that a citizenry can recognize and accept."68 But such
formulae also have interpretive consequences for the reader, since genre
is a powerful explanatory tool that provides a schema facilitating the
reader's understanding of a text's purpose and meaning. 69 Accordingly,
within the confines of the genre, every judicial opinion "must somehow
use or misuse the possibilit[y] its structure evokes and the expectations
that help structure its readers' responses." 70 By examining some of the
conventions of the appellate decision, it is possible to see more clearly
the ways that State ex rel. Martinez uses several of these conventions
successfully to create an external veneer of legitimacy, while its
simultaneous failure to make appropriate use of others undermines its
authority.
There are a number of basic structural elements that are typically
included in an appellate opinion, making it immediately recognizable as
a court decision. These include the caption, a statement of facts, a
description of the procedural history, a discussion of the evolution of
precedent, and the disposition of the case.7' An opinion also includes
citations to prior law in the form of statutes, cases, and constitutions and
may include citations to treatises and other secondary materials. In
addition to citations, a decision typically contains excerpts of these
authorities as texts within the text. Even the grammatical structures that
an opinion uses follow certain conventions -often ones that have been
identified by linguists as "obfuscating the meaning of written
communications." 72 All of these structural elements are easy to identify
67. PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHnP 125 (1999).
68. Ferguson, supra note 66, at 202.
69. See id. at 217.
70. John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REv. 447,451 (2001).
71. For a detailed discussion of the use and purpose of some of the conventions
discussed in this paragraph, see generally id.
72. Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction
Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 75 (1998) (describing the author's statistical analysis of
sentence structures used in judicial opinions and finding that federal jurisdiction opinions
contain more obfuscatory language than cases decided on the merits).
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and fairly easy to imitate, and State ex rel. Martinez is successful in
making use of them. By doing so, the text identifies itself as a judicial
decision and seeks to claim the authority that generally accompanies
such a text.
Judicial opinions also employ particular rhetorical and narrative
strategies to support their legitimacy. Some of the simplest of these
include formal language, which is often used by people in government
or other positions of authority "as a means of exercising power";73 the
concealment of the author, both in refusing to acknowledge the role that
clerks and other judges play in the creation of an opinion, which
suggests that the opinion was not negotiated but was simply the product
of right reasoning, and in eliminating the "I," which suggests that that
reasoning is not affected by personal bias; an objective tone, which seeks
to maintain the illusion that judges simply apply the law to the facts of a
case; the use of the parties as a metonymic substitute for their lawyers,
which, rhetorically at least, eliminates the possibility that the outcome
was reached because of lawyers' tactics rather than because it was the
necessary result;74 and the accretion of authority upon authority, which
attempts to show that the court's decision is the logical outcome based
on previous law.
Another significant rhetorical convention of the genre is the way
that the judicial opinion takes the language of others (typically in the
form of quotes from prior cases and other legal authorities) and employs
it for its own ends. This appropriation is a part of what the Russian
formalist Mikhail Bakhtin calls the "monologic" discourse that typifies
authoritarian texts. 75 The appellate opinion incorporates the words of
others into its own monologue, not to express the diversity of their
views, but to bend them to support the ideas expressed in the opinion.
An opinion will often raise alternative views, but only "within the
controlling voice of the judicial speaker and with the foreknowledge that
these alternatives will submit to that speaker's own authorial
intentions." 76 By using other texts within the decision, the appellate
opinion attempts to suppress the conflicts, contradictions, and differing
perspectives embodied in those varied texts and make them appear to
support the closed, unitary logic of the decision.
73. Id. at 86-87 (citing the anthropologist Maurice Bloch, INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL
LANGUAGE AND ORATORY IN TRADITIONAL SOCIETY 23 (Maurice Bloch ed., 1975)).
74. See Leubsdorf, supra note 70, at 471.
75. See Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Discourse in the Novel, in THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR
ESSAYS BY M.M. BAKHTIN 269-70, 342-44 (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael
Holquist trans., 1981).
76. Ferguson, supra note 66, at 205.
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State ex rel. Martinez successfully uses these rhetorical strategies
to help support its assertion of authority. By employing these
conventions of objectivity, formality, and monologic discourse in
combination with the structural elements of a judicial opinion, the text
creates at least a superficial sense of its legitimacy. Ultimately, though,
these efforts at self-justification are betrayed by the court's flawed
reasoning and by its failure to use the conventions of historical truth and
stare decisis in ways appropriate to the genre.
B. Historical Truth as a Convention of the Genre
The primary failure of State ex rel. Martinez is in the way that it
makes use of history. The presumption of the existence of historical truth
is an important convention of the appellate opinion.77 The quality of this
kind of "truth" does not have to be absolute. A practical, consensus-
based version of the truth is sufficient, but the legitimacy of the judicial
process depends on the court's ability to determine "what really
happened" with at least some plausibility.78 This is because the
consequences of judicial determinations are very real: "Legal
interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death .... A judge
articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses
his freedom, his property, his children, even his life." 79 If these acts of
violence are to be socially sanctioned, they must rest on a belief that
courts are competent to determine what actually happened in the past
and to decide on that basis the consequences that should follow. For a
court to suggest that it is unable to make decisions about "what really
happened" is to give up a central function of the judiciary and one of the
primary foundations of its legitimacy. This is exactly what State ex rel.
Martinez does.
State ex rel. Martinez contains the remarkable statement that "the
historical validity of the pueblo rights doctrine is irrelevant" to the
court's determination that the doctrine should be overruled.8s There is a
whole host of problems with this statement, the main one being that it is
almost nonsensical to argue that history is irrelevant in the adjudication
of what are claimed to be preexisting historical rights. Under the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, U.S. courts are required to protect any property
77. See id. at 217.
78. Stephen C. Yeazell, Convention, Fiction, and Law, 13 NEw LrrERARY HIST. 89, 89
(1981).
79. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
80. State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 135 N.M. 375, 386, 89 P.3d 47, 58 (2004).
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rights held by Mexican municipalities in 1848.81 Under the New Mexico
Constitution, "[n]othing contained in" the section of the constitution
establishing the doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use "shall
be construed to impair existing vested rights.... "82 If the pueblo to which
Las Vegas is a successor had an expanding water right in 1848, that right
should arguably still be protected under both the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and the New Mexico Constitution. This would certainly appear
at a minimum to be relevant, if not dispositive of the City's right to take
and use the water today. Furthermore, rejection of the pueblo water
rights doctrine without a determination about whether or not it is
historically valid suggests that the court is permitted to nullify vested
property rights arbitrarily, without even having to acknowledge that the
rights existed in the first place. It may be that the court does not mind
doing this because it is fairly certain that there was no pueblo water right
under Mexican law, but if that is the case, what is interesting about State
ex rel. Martinez is why the court is not willing to just say so.
After examining historical evidence on the pueblo water rights
doctrine, State ex rel. Martinez concludes that, despite the overwhelming
testimony and documentation indicating that the doctrine did not exist
under Spanish and Mexican law, such evidence is not "sufficiently clear
to justify overruling Cartwright on this basis." 83 Ostensibly, this is
because the court places a great premium on the importance of the
doctrine of stare decisis8 4 The court states,
Very weighty considerations underlie the principle that
courts should not lightly overrule past decisions. Among
these are the desirability that the law furnish a clear guide
for the conduct of individuals, to enable them to plan their
affairs with assurance against untoward surprise; the
importance of furthering fair and expeditious adjudication
by eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant
proposition in every case; and the necessity of maintaining
public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and
reasoned judgments.8
81. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico,
U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2,1848,9 Stat. 922,929-30 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo].
82. See N.M. CONST. art XVI, § 1; NMSA 1978 § 72-9-1 (1997 Repl.).
83. State ex rel. Martinez, 135 N.M. at 384, 89 P.3d at 56.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 383, 89 P.3d at 55 (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375,
403 (1970)).
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These values are certainly important, but since the court goes
ahead and overrules Cartwright anyway, the question really becomes
why the court selected one basis on which to overrule existing precedent
over another. It is not clear that the fact that the pueblo rights doctrine
would conflict with the system of prior appropriation is necessarily more
significant than the fact that the pueblo rights doctrine did not exist
under Spanish or Mexican law.
The reason offered by State ex rel. Martinez is that historical truth
is too difficult for the judiciary to get a hold of. Pointing to the fact that
our understanding of history can "fluctuate based on newly found
historical evidence or novel interpretations of extant sources," 86 the court
is essentially admitting that it is just easier to decide the case on the basis
of a conflict with the current system of water use. But if it is true that the
court avoids history because history is too hard to pin down, the court in
effect abandons one of what are conventionally understood to be its
primary functions:87 to determine the truth of what happened in a
particular case and to mete out justice on that basis.
State ex rel. Martinez is right to say that one of the difficulties of
evaluating history is that historical opinions "fluctuate" and that such
fluctuation depends on both the theoretical perspective of the person
looking at the facts as well as on the facts themselves.88 Where the text
fails to meet the requirements of the genre is in suggesting that these
varying historical opinions can prevent the court from doing the job of
making determinations about the past. State ex rel. Martinez says that
"[u]nlike history as a matter of theory,...the law, as reflected by the
doctrine of stare decisis, requires a greater degree of certainty and
predictability." 89 The risk is that if new historical evidence were
discovered supporting the existence of the pueblo rights doctrine under
Spanish and Mexican law, there would be more legal disputes over the
validity of the doctrine.90 The court finds that this risk creates "an
intolerable degree of uncertainty." 91
86. Id. at 385, 89 P.3d at 57.
87. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability
of Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1357 (1985), for an interesting discussion about the importance
of convincing the public that a court's decision is a statement about the event itself-about
the truth of what happened-rather than merely about the sufficiency of the evidence
presented in a criminal trial. Nesson suggests that in order to make the members of the
public internalize the behavioral messages that the law seeks to send, they must believe
that the court's verdict is a statement about the truth of what actually occurred. Id. at 1361.
88. See State ex rel. Martinez, 135 N.M. at 385, 89 P.3d at 57.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 385-86, 89 P.3d at 57-58.
91. Id. at 386, 89 P.3d at 58.
1104 [Vol. 45
PUEBLO WATER RIGHTS
While the possibility of new evidence or changes in theories is
certainly a risk, it can hardly be termed intolerable, since courts handle it
all the time. In every case, the court (or the jury in its role as factfinder)
has to make do with incomplete information in order to reconstruct the
past and determine, for instance, who is liable, who is the rightful owner,
whether the defendant committed the criminal act, and so on.
In this case, the determination about the law of antecedent
sovereigns is not a question of fact but instead is one of law, and it has
been suggested that a court's process of arriving at appropriate legal
principles and precedents is quite similar to the process a historian uses
in looking at the past:
There is, after all, a fairly close relationship between the
day-to-day methodology of the judicial process and that of
historical scholarship. When a court ascertains the nature of
the law to be applied to a case through an examination of a
stream of judicial precedent .... it plays the role of historian.
A historian might well say that in this process the court
goes to the "primary sources."
Further, when a court finds it necessary, as it frequently
does, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding earlier
judicial expositions of the law, it gets still deeper into the
writing of history. A historian would label the latter
process "external documentary criticism," engaged in as a
means to an adequate and sophisticated evaluation of the
source in question.92
As another example of how courts manage the uncertainties
posed by changing factual information and theoretical frameworks,
courts frequently have to base decisions on the expert testimony of
scientists who, like historians, are always reevaluating and retesting their
hypotheses. Courts manage to assess the likelihood that a particular
scientific theory is valid by using such tools as the Daubert93 factors,
cross-examination of the expert, and the presentation of contrary
evidence. Historians have suggested that this is a valid method of
92. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 121
(1965).
93. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-96 (1993) (listing as
relevant factors for determining scientific reliability: whether the theory or technique can
be or has been tested, whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review
and publication, whether there are standards controlling the technique's operation and a
known or potential rate of error, and whether there is widespread acceptance of the theory
or technique in the relevant scientific community).
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rooting out historical truth as well, 94 arguing that while "historical 'truth'
may be ephemeral, historical 'falsity' is not" since "historical
interpretations.. .can be assessed by examining the degree to which they
follow the professional norms of academic and legal historians, and by
examining whether they have foundation in historical evidence." 95
Because the court is necessarily so practiced in its ability to take a look at
documentary evidence and expert testimony, its claim to lack
competence in this area sounds a false note.
Even if, as the State ex rel. Martinez court suggested, "[a] trial
often demands more than a historian can offer" since it "asks for
definitive answers when a historian may prefer to give cautious,
conditional answers,"96 this does not relieve the court of its responsibility
to at least be willing to search for the truth. While concepts like "proof,
[and] even truth.. .have acquired in the social sciences an unfashionable
ring,"97 they maintain their power in our justice system. This is because
trials are "a form of inquiry into past events [that begin] with the
underlying assumption of some kind of correlation between our
statements about the world and the world itself"98 - that is, between the
evidence presented about what happened and what actually took place.
If the court refuses to make a commitment to the facts of a case, it
undermines its authority as an arbiter of the truth.99
94. See e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, The Strawhorsemen of the Apocalypse: Relativism and the
Historian as Expert Witness, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1169, 1176 (1998) (" [Tlhe adversarial process is
an excellent buffer against those who would abuse historical truths in the interests of their
client. Through the use of rival experts and impeaching cross-examination, lawyers put
historians' testimony through a crucible that uncovers biases, flawed data, laughable
interpretations, and outright deceit.").
95. Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses of
History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 818 (1997).
96. Schiller, supra note 94, at 1175-76.
97. Carlo Ginzburg, Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian, in QUESTIONS OF
EVIDENCE: PROOF, PRACTICE, AND PERSUASION ACROSS TiE DISCIPLINES 290, 294 (James
Chandler et al. eds., 1994).
98. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 94 (1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
99. Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First Amendment,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 908 (1993) ("[Tlhe Court relies on history to provide a constraint on
judicial decisionmaking. Justices want very much to make it appear that their decisions are
not based on their personal opinions, but instead are derived from an external source. The
Court has expressly defended history on this ground- that it provides an objective basis
for decisions as an alternative to impermissible value imposition by the Court.").
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C. Stare Decisis as a Convention of the Genre
Adherence to precedent is another way that judicial opinions
assert their legitimacy, and State ex rel. Martinez at least attempts, albeit
unsuccessfully, to make use of this convention in order to justify its
rejection of history. The doctrine of stare decisis is one way that a judicial
opinion maintains the fiction that its authors are simply applying, rather
than making, law. Furthermore, by relying on the law as established in
past opinions, an appellate decision suggests that the law is knowable
and predictable. 100 In its adherence to past precedent, an opinion
demonstrates its rejection of "precipitate, individualized and arbitrary
action" 101 and offers assurance that judicial decision making is
determined, rather than impulsive and uncontrolled. State ex rel. Martinez
expressly recognizes the importance of stare decisis to a decision's efforts
at self-justification when it states that the doctrine of stare decisis is
based in part on "the necessity of maintaining public faith in the
judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments."10 2
The State ex rel. Martinez court faced the problem of how to
ascertain the nature of Mexican municipal water law in 1848. The court
was presented with three conflicting views of the history of the law. Two
of these - the pueblo water right and the doctrine of prior
appropriation -at least according to the evidence before the court, were
essentially judicially constructed and not based in historical fact:
According to the evidence presented in the case, the pueblo water rights
doctrine appeared to be an invention of the California judiciary. 1°3
Similarly, State ex rel. Martinez admits that the doctrine of prior
appropriation is "based on this Court's interpretation of the law of
antecedent sovereigns." 1' 4
Among the court's choices, the third version of history- that the
Mexican legal system followed the system of equitable apportionment
and common use -seems to be best supported by the historical evidence
presented to the court, since (1) it was argued by the State Engineer, (2) it
can be inferred from historical documents such as the Plan of Pitic and
the Recopilacion, and (3) several secondary sources cited by the court
seem to endorse it. Ironically, it is this version of history that State ex rel.
Martinez dismisses most easily. This would be fine if the opinion were
100. See Yeazell, supra note 78, at 93.
101. Walter B. Kennedy, Functional Nonsense and the Transcendental Approach, 5
FORDHAM L. REV. 272, 293 (1936).
102. State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 135 N.M. 375,383, 89 P.3d 47,55 (2004).
103. See State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 118 N.M. 257, 260-63, 880 P.2d 868,
871-74 (Ct. App. 1994).
104. State ex rel. Martinez, 135 N.M. at 384, 89 P.3d at 56.
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intellectually forthright and stated that the court will not adopt a system
of equitable apportionment because New Mexico has adhered to the
doctrine of prior appropriation since the early 1900s, and it just would be
too complicated to change things now. But the court does not do this.
Instead, State ex rel. Martinez takes the position that its description of
historical facts does not have to have its referents in historical reality
since history is what the court says it is.
Pointing out that earlier New Mexico decisions had declared that
the system of prior appropriation and beneficial use was the system in
place under Spanish and Mexican law, State ex rel. Martinez refuses to
abandon the pueblo rights doctrine based on the State Engineer's
argument that historical evidence shows that Mexico followed a system
of equitable apportionment and common use. Rather than making
decisions founded on the historical evidence before it, the court stuck to
the version of history that it had created in its earlier opinions. This was
because an acknowledgment that equitable apportionment was the
system actually used would "undermin[e] the historical basis for New
Mexico's adoption of the doctrine of prior appropriation as a legacy of
antecedent sovereigns." 105
The reasoning of this statement is strange. To refuse to admit
that one version of history (the pueblo water right) is inaccurate because
doing so would require an admission that a second version (equitable
apportionment) is accurate, which in turn would mean that the version
long-since adopted by the court (prior appropriation) is wrong, suggests
that the court has no duty to the truth. State ex rel. Martinez forecloses
recognition of historical fact in the interest of maintaining a made up
version of the past because it cannot "reject the pueblo rights doctrine
through a recognition of equitable apportionment and common use
without undermining" the version of history it previously endorsed. 106
What this means is that the court wants to stand by this historical fiction
simply because it is its own creation. While this at least suggests that
stare decisis is a guiding principle in the case, it does not turn out to be a
reasoned or consistent one.
Such stubborn adherence to what appears to an incorrect view of
history might be validated by the fact that "once a historical
interpretation has been made by the Court.. .principles of stare decisis
render the historical interpretation into law through the same common
law processes that render interpretations of case law into judicial
precedent." 10 7 But here the court selectively applied the principle of stare
105. Id. at 385, 89 P.3d at 57.
106. Id.
107. Richards, supra note 95, at 840.
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decisis to one historical interpretation supported by precedent - the
doctrine of prior appropriation-but not to the pueblo rights doctrine,
which was also supported by the precedent created by Cartwright. It is
history by "judicial fiat" either way.108 Because the court offers no
principled reason for applying the doctrine of stare decisis to some cases
and not to others, its use becomes arbitrary, and the doctrine loses its
value as a restraint on arbitrary judicial decision making.
D. Flawed Reasoning and the Conflict between Public Policy and
Historical Rights
Since State ex rel. Martinez declines to dispute Cartwright's
historical determination, the court logically should have begun its
discussion eliminating the pueblo water right from New Mexico law
with the premise that such a right existed historically. Had it followed
this logical path, the court would then have had to face the problem of
how to get rid of the doctrine without doing damage to the legitimacy of
its prior decision-and by extension, the legitimacy of the court. This
would have been a difficult task. To nullify the right without a finding
that it never existed in the first place would have left the court exposed
to the charge of relieving people of their property rights as a matter of
convenience and without compensation. In order to get around its
original problem with history, State ex rel. Martinez takes another route: It
finds that while the pueblo water right may have existed under Mexican
law, it was extinguished in 1848 when the Mexican government signed
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with the United States. By eliminating
the right in this way, State ex rel. Martinez is at greater liberty to overrule
the doctrine on public policy grounds. Transforming the pueblo water
right into one that first came into being in New Mexico when the court
recognized it in Cartwright frees the court from the ethical and legal
question of whether to abrogate a property right that may have existed
for hundreds of years and leaves the court to face only the question of
whether it had been too generous in granting a new property right. In
this way, abolition of the doctrine based on the policy rationale that it
conflicts with prevailing principles of water law in the state becomes, at
least theoretically, much less difficult. But because the opinion's analysis
of whether the right should be recognized under the Treaty is deeply
flawed and internally contradictory, and because the discussion of the
conflict between the pueblo water right and current New Mexico water
law is based on the court's earlier irrational use of historical evidence,
108. See Kelly, supra note 92, at 122
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the court's public policy rationale is ultimately as inadequate as its
historical analysis.
1. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Inchoate Property Rights
Mexico ceded almost half of its territory to the United States in
1848.109 Under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexicans who lived or
owned property in this territory were assured that people "now
established in territories previously belonging to Mexico.. .shall be free to
continue where they now reside.. .retaining the property which they
possess in the said terries...."110 Even absent landowners were
promised that "property of every kind, now belonging to Mexicans not
established there, shall be inviolably respected.""'
Because the treaty was not considered to be self-executing,
Congress required property owners holding title pursuant to Spanish
and Mexican land grants to have their rights confirmed by the U.S.
government. 112 Congress passed the Act of March 3, 1891,113 establishing
the Court of Private Land Claims, which would determine whether titles
to property claimed under Spanish and Mexican grants were valid." 4
The Act prohibited the confirmation of inchoate rights, stating that no
"grant or other authority to acquire land made upon any condition or
requirement, either antecedent or subsequent, shall be admitted or
confirmed unless it shall appear that every such condition and
requirement was performed within the time and in the manner stated" in
the grant."5 The Supreme Court broadened this provision to mean that,
under the Act, the Court of Private Land Claims could only confirm a
right that had not been perfected if "the claimant could, by right, and not
by grace, have demanded that it should be made perfect by the former
government, had the territory not been acquired by the United
States.... "116
Cartwright concluded that the pueblo water right was a form of
property protected by the treaty and expressly stated that it was a vested
109. See Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest, Property Rights, Indian Treaties, and the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 26 N.M. L. REV. 201 (1996).
110. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 81, at 929.
111. Id.
112. Klein, supra note 109, at 209.
113. An Act to Establish the Court of Private Land Claims, and to provide for the
settlement of private land claims in certain States and Territories, 26 Stat. 854 (1981)
[hereinafter Act to Establish the Court of Private Land Claims].
114. Klein, supra note 109, at 226.
115. Act to Establish the Court of Private Land Claims, 26 Stat. 854, 861.
116. Ainsa v. United States, 161 U.S. 208, 223 (1896) (emphasis added).
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right." 7 In contrast, State ex rel. Martinez concluded that the pueblo water
right was an inchoate right that did not come under the protections of
either the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo or the New Mexico
Constitution.118 The court made this about-face by drawing an analogy
between a community's right to land granted for community use and a
city's right to water under the pueblo water rights doctrine. State ex rel.
Martinez cited two U.S. Supreme Court cases holding that communal
ownership of land under Mexican law was an inchoate right not
protected by the treaty.119 In both of these cases, United States v. City of
Santa Fe and United States v. Sandoval, successors to Spanish and Mexican
land grants filed petitions in the Court of Private Land Claims seeking
confirmation of their property rights. Each case involved a land grant
that permitted some portion of the pueblo to be assigned to the
community as a whole. The Supreme Court examined sources of Spanish
law and found that, unlike property allotted to individual settlers, land
designated as community property remained subject to the authority of
the king, since the king was free to reassign it to private individuals. 120
Because possession of the common lands existed at the grace of the
sovereign and neither the settlers nor the town could make a claim as of
right to fee title to the property,121 the right to such lands was not
protected by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.122
Under the Plan of Pitic, the pueblo water right, like the right to
common lands, was subject to the discretion of the Spanish and Mexican
governments. The Plan states that "water privileges.. .shall continue as
long as they are not changed or altered by his Majesty.... "123 As a result,
these Supreme Court cases would provide an adequate foundation on
which to rest a claim that the pueblo water right did not survive the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. However, in order to make this argument,
State ex rel. Martinez has to rely on the very historical interpretation of
Spanish and Mexican water law that it had refused to recognize earlier in
the opinion: the doctrine of equitable apportionment.
The court reasons as follows:
117. See Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 66 N.M. 64, 72, 85, 343 P.2d 654, 659, 668
(1958).
118. State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 135 N.M. 375, 388-89, 89 P.3d 47, 60-61
(2004).
119. Id. at 388, 89 P.3d at 60 (citing United States v. City of Santa Fe, 165 U.S. 675, 714
(1897); United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278, 293-94 (1897)).
120. City of Santa Fe, 165 U.S. at 709; Sandoval, 167 U.S. at 295-97.
121. Sandoval, 167 U.S. at 298.
122. See City of Santa Fe, 165 U.S. at 713-16; Sandoval, 167 U.S. at 293-94.
123. Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 66 N.M. 64, 72, 85, 343 P.2d 654, 677 (1959)
(Federici, D.J., dissenting) (quoting the Plan of Pitic, § 7).
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To the extent that Spanish and Mexican law recognized a
pueblo water right, the nature of the right that allowed
increased water usage in response to growing needs of the
pueblo would have been a matter of grace, not a matter of
right; future expansion of water rights subsequent to the
colonization grant would have been subject to the
sovereign's power of reallocation according to a change in
circumstances.1 24
As the only evidence in support of the claim that antecedent
sovereigns retained control over the right to increasing amounts of
water, the court cites to a sentence in a law review article stating that
"[e]ach grant petition occasioned an official reevaluation of the adequacy
of water supplies in the particular vicinity." 12 From this single sentence,
the court is able to conclude: "[t]hus, the expanding quality of the pueblo
right, being inchoate, was not guaranteed by the Treaty." 126
The problem with this line of reasoning is that the quoted
sentence itself at least suggests that water was allocated on equitable
principles-for why else would a government need to adjust water
rights based on "the adequacy of water supplies in a particular vicinity"
if not to ensure the adequacy of water supplies for all the users in the
area? But regardless of whether or not reallocation would be based on
equitable principles, this kind of redistribution certainly would not
comply with the doctrine of prior appropriation, which State ex rel.
Martinez has already claimed was the law under the Spanish and
Mexican governments. Furthermore, an examination of the rest of the
cited article reveals that it is devoted to the thesis that pueblos, like other
water users, were allotted water rights based on a system of equitable
apportionment. 127 State ex rel. Martinez therefore depends on the
historical doctrine it previously rejected in order to reach its conclusion
that the pueblo water right, presuming it existed, was not protected
under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. The court offers no explanation
124. State ex rel. Martinez, 135 N.M. at 388, 89 P.3d at 60.
125. Id. (citing Stevens, supra note 8, at 569).
126. Id.
127. See Stevens, supra note 8, at 568-81. Stevens points out that petitions for grants
were "granted, denied, or issued with express conditions designed to prevent prejudice to
third parties," and that Spanish and Mexican law provided for adjudication proceedings in
which "the water users of a vicinity were given the opportunity to demonstrate their needs
and their claims of right." Id. at 569-70. The judge would assess relative water rights based
on "(1) prior use, (2) legal right, (3) need, (4) prejudice or injury to third parties, (5) intent or
purpose of use, and (6) equity and the common good," and these factors were "balanced
against the countervailing interests of other claimants in order to reach an allocation that
achieved the greatest common good with the least harm to third parties." Id. at 574.
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as to why equitable apportionment was not the law of Spain and Mexico
in Part A of its discussion of the pueblo water rights doctrine but
becomes the law of Spain and Mexico in Part B, when the court wishes to
claim that the pueblo water right is not a vested right.
2. The Incompatibility of the Pueblo Water Rights Doctrine with General
Principles of New Mexico Water Law
Although State ex rel. Martinez is able to nullify the pueblo water
right by claiming that, by definition, a pueblo's expanding water right
could never be vested, this historical argument is not the foundation of
the court's opinion. Instead, State ex rel. Martinez uses its conclusion that
the right, if it existed, did not survive the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
to eliminate the question of the doctrine's historical validity and instead
reframes the issue as one of a policy conflict between the doctrine and
general principles of New Mexico water law. In support of its conclusion
that the doctrine clashes with water law in New Mexico, the court
revives its points about New Mexico's adherence to the doctrine of prior
appropriation and beneficial use, combines this argument with the
proposition that the expansive element of the pueblo water right is not a
vested right under New Mexico law, and adds a third rationale, that
continued recognition of the right would make the State Engineer's duty
to adjudicate water rights more difficult.2' None of the three reasons
provides an adequate basis for overruling Cartwright in the absence of a
determination that the right did not exist historically, even when the
issues of the inchoate nature of the right and the conflict with the
doctrine of prior appropriation are repackaged as policy considerations
rather than historical questions.
The doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use was not
formally adopted in New Mexico until 1907.129 Because this would have
been after the 1835 vesting of Las Vegas's pueblo water right (assuming
that such a right existed and could be vested), New Mexico would be
obligated to respect and uphold the pueblo water right under the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the New Mexico Constitution. It is true that
the protections of the treaty have been increasingly narrowed by statute
and by court decisions, such that the treaty might no longer protect the
right.130 However, the protections of the New Mexico Constitution have
not been so narrowed. As a result, the fact that the pueblo water right
128. See State ex rel. Martinez, 135 N.M. at 388-89,89 P.3d at 60-61.
129. See id. at 388,89 P.3d at 60.
130. See, e.g., Ainsa v. United States, 161 U.S. 208, 223 (1896); United States v. City of
Santa Fe, 165 U.S. 675, 713-16 (1897); United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278, 293-94 (1897).
1113Fall 20051
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
arguably conflicts with the doctrine of prior appropriation is, under the
New Mexico Constitution, not a valid reason for abrogating the right.
Likewise, the claim that the right is inchoate is not a valid reason
for abrogating the right. At least one other court has found that a
settlement's expanding water right was a vested right protected by the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.131 The New Mexico Constitution
specifically provides an exception to the general rule of prior
appropriation and beneficial use when a water right has vested before
the adoption of the constitution.132 There is no reason why a property
right that can only be realized in the future must necessarily be
considered inchoate. A vested right is defined as "ha[ving] become a
completed, consummated right for present or future enjoyment; not
contingent; unconditional; absolute." 33 The pueblo water right is not
contingent upon any conditions, but if, as the court claims in one section
of its opinion, it is subject to reallocation by the sovereign, it may not
properly be termed "absolute." In this way, the inchoate nature of the
right is necessarily predicated on the fact that equitable apportionment
was the law of Spain and Mexico. If, as the court says in another section
of its opinion, Spanish and Mexican law did not follow the system of
equitable apportionment, then the decision offers no factual support for
its conclusion that the right is inchoate rather than vested.
The final reason State ex rel. Martinez offers to justify its decision
overruling the pueblo water rights doctrine on the basis of a conflict with
current New Mexico water law is that continuing to recognize the
doctrine would make it more difficult for the State Engineer to regulate
water rights. This is almost certainly true, but the court devotes little
attention to the development of this rationale. Without discussion, the
court merely cites statutes requiring the State Engineer to prepare a
comprehensive state water plan, to adhere to the requirements of
interstate water compacts, and to protect and conserve water."" As the
only basis for its decision that is not undermined somewhere else in the
opinion, the imposition on the State Engineer is the strongest justification
the court offers for overruling the pueblo water rights doctrine.
Unfortunately, State ex rel. Martinez fails to bolster this rationale with any
significant discussion of its importance. Without such a discussion, the
131. See New Mexico v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1010 (D.N.M. 1985) (finding that the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo protected the expanding nature of an Indian Pueblo water
right, such that the Pueblo had "the prior right to use all of the waters of the stream system
necessary for their domestic uses and that necessary to irrigate their lands...").
132. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
133. BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1557 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added).
134. State ex rel. Martinez, 135 N.M. at 389, 89 P.3d at 61.
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court fails to support the claim that legitimate concerns about the
complex responsibilities of the State Engineer should outweigh the
dictates of either the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo or the New Mexico
Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
The State ex rel. Martinez opinion does not work because it fails to
meet the generic requirements of an appellate opinion and consequently
fails to support its claim to authority. On the one hand, the text makes
use of conventional forms and relies on the types of reasoning
considered necessary in a judicial decision. These attributes help to
create a sense of the opinion's legitimacy and, at this level, the opinion is
a success: It incorporates sections labeled "Factual and Procedural
Background," "Historical Basis for the Pueblo Rights Doctrine," and so
on, and it refers to prior case law, to statutes, and to the law of
antecedent sovereigns and discusses how these laws apply to the facts of
this case. But once past these outward signs of a convincing judicial
decision, the opinion falls apart.
State ex rel. Martinez erodes any authority created by its
structural forms and rhetorical conventions by failing to attain the
degree of coherence and analytical integrity necessary in an appellate
court's published decision. A supreme court opinion is not a poem, and
if it behaves like one, it has failed. State ex rel. Martinez skips from one
idea to another with the hope that the reader's affective response to the
repetitive use of motifs like stare decisis, inconsistency with New Mexico
water law, inchoate rights, and the changing nature of historical
interpretation will carry her over the logical gaps. Needless to say, the
motifs do not do the trick, and one is sorry that the opinion seems to try.
Rather than attempting to claim that history is irrelevant in the
adjudication of historical property rights, rather than clinging to what
the court offers as a judicially invented historical scenario, rather than
using the doctrine of stare decisis inconsistently to serve what may be
legitimate policy concerns, the court could have simply said that an
examination of the historical evidence currently available has made it
clear that there never was an expanding pueblo water right under
Spanish or Mexican law and overruled Cartwright on this basis. It could
have then suggested that, even if it were later discovered that such a
right existed, its historical validity could not outweigh the social and
environmental costs of allowing successors to colonization pueblos to
extinguish the rights of prior appropriators or the administrative costs of
asking the State Engineer's office to manage the adjudication of an ever-
changing water right. Whether or not that kind of an opinion would
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have been right on legal or policy grounds, such an approach would
have eliminated the need for all of the inconsistencies that currently
detract from State ex rel. Martinez. That kind of opinion would have
worked.
